Abstract: In this article, we discuss recent evidence from experimental economics on the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and eciency have been seen as opposing aims in such work environments: individual pay-for-performance wage schemes maximize eciency but might lead to inequitable outcomes. We present ndings from laboratory experiments that show under which circumstances partially incomplete contracts can create equitable work environments while at the same time reaching surprisingly ecient outcomes.
Introduction
Economic exchange frequently relies on informal agreements that specify the contracting parties' obligations only imprecisely. Such contractual incompleteness is particularly widespread in the labor market. Fully contingent, explicit contracts are absent in a wide range of industries and occupations. Rather, employment contracts often only stipulate quite general parameters of the work relationship, like xed salaries, required working times, or vacation entitlements. This does not only imply that many important aspects of an employment relationship such as the assignment of employees to specic tasksare left unspecied. It also means that workers' payments are often not explicitly tied to their performance. From an economic perspective, this might seem counter-intuitive at rst sight. If pay does not depend on performance, workers are left with at least some discretion on whether and how to fulll their obligations. This in turn can give rise to moral hazard, i.e., worker slacking and other behaviors that are potentially detrimental to the employer.
However, economic models also oer a number of potential explanations for why contractual incompleteness in employment relationships is ubiquitous. A rst and rather simple explanation is that it is inherently dicult to objectively measure employees' performance and work eort. Employers and employees might thus decide to include only those obligations in the employment contract * We thank Michael Siekemeier for excellent research assistance.
which they can actually enforce and verify. Research in contract and game theory has also identied circumstances where it might not be necessary or even undesirable for an employer to connect pay more closely to performance although this would, in principle, be possible. First, employment relations are typically repeated interactions over a long time horizon. Opportunistic behavior in earlier periods can be punished later on. Thus, there is scope for socalled`relational' contracts that are self-enforcing in the sense that the value of future interaction is higher than the short-run gains from opportunistic behavior (MacLeod/Malcomson 1989; Baker/Gibbons/Murphy 1992) . A similar logic applies if employees have concerns for their future career. If employees are eager to qualify for a better paid job in the future, either within the rm (Lazear/Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986) or in other rms (Fama 1980; Holmström 1999; , they have strong implicit incentives to perform well, even though their current pay is not explicitly tied to performance. Finally, the so called multitasking problem can induce an employer to refrain from using high-powered pay-for-performance schemes. Multitasking problems occur if the employer aims at inducing the employee to engage in multiple tasks, but can only verify performance in a subset of these tasks (Holmström/Milgrom 1991) .
Beside these purely pecuniary causes of contractual incompleteness there can also be psychological reasons for why employers do not want or need to use explicit performance-based incentive schemes. Evidence along these lines can be found in recent research on the psychological foundations of incentives. An impressive body of literature in psychology and behavioral economics has demonstrated that employees' behavior does not only depend on the relationship between measured performance and pay. Rather, pay-for-performance schemes may have unintended, dysfunctional behavioral consequences if workers are concerned about horizontal or vertical equity (Adams 1965) , are intrinsically motivated (Deci 1971; Gneezy/Rustichini 2000) , or dislike being controlled (Falk/ Kosfeld 2006) .
Moreover, moral-hazard problems may potentially be mitigated by preferences for fairness or reciprocity, since workers and employers with social preferences might not exploit existing opportunities for opportunistic behavior. Especially reciprocity, i.e., the willingness to reward kind actions and punish unkind ones even at a cost to oneself, has been discussed as an eective means for eliciting work eort under contractual incompleteness. Consequently, Akerlof (1982) argues that many employment relationships resemble`gift-exchange' relationships, in which rms voluntarily pay high wages and workers voluntarily repay these with eort in excess of the minimum work standard. The introduction of a simple paradigm to study such relationships in the laboratory by Fehr et al. (1993) gave economists a tool to address many of the questions surrounding gift exchange. In the simplest form of this prototypical paradigm, one player (thè employer') interacts with one`employee'. The employer pays an upfront wage and has to trust that the employee repays the`gift' of a high wage by voluntarily providing a high level of productive work eort. Potential eciency gains through eort provision, however, will not be realized if all players are rational and selsh: the employee will provide the minimal eort since eort is costly and will only reduce his monetary payo and, anticipating this, the employer will pay the minimum wage.
However, a large number of papers has demonstrated empirically that employees who feel treated kindly indeed tend to repay a generous wage payment by voluntarily providing high work eort even in one-shot situations where no future gains can be expected (e.g., Fehr/Gächter/Kirchsteiger 1997; Fehr/Falk 2002; Kube et al. 2011) . Reciprocity in employment relationships can also imply that workers who feel treated unfairly withhold work eort, e.g., after an arbitrary wage cut (e.g., Kube et al. 2010; Cohn et al. 2011) . Both positive and negative reciprocal reactions illustrate how social preferences might work as a device to enforce incomplete contracts in employment relationships. The mounting evidence on gift exchange and the importance of social preferences in the working place has led to a partial re-assessment of long-standing discussions in labor economics. In particular, it has illustrated that economic eciency and equity do often not stand in contrast but can be achieved at the same time. By increasing the perceived equity of workers' wages, employers can induce workers to provide higher work eort which in turn can enhance economic eciency.
In this article, we present and discuss recent evidence on the impact of social preferences on work behavior. We focus on a selection of studies that use economic experiments to analyze the interaction between a single employer (principal) and multiple employees (agents).
1 While the majority of gift-exchange studies investigates settings where a principal is matched with a single agent, a multi-agent setting is at the same time more realistic and allows analyzing more nuanced implications of social preferences. Most importantly, it permits to take a more detailed view on workers' perceptions of what constitutes a fair or equitable action by the employer; in particular with respect to the wage received.
When an employer interacts with more than one agent, fairness concerns and social comparisons are no longer only relevant along a vertical dimension, i.e., between the employer and the employee. Rather, social comparisons along a horizontal dimension, i.e., between workers on the same layer of the hierarchy, might be crucial for fairness perceptions and worker behavior. Relative wage concerns between co-workers might inuence their satisfaction with and reaction to a given wage oer. Wage discrimination between workers will therefore be a recurring theme in this article. As will become clear, the relation between equity and eciency becomes more complex in a multi-worker setup.
We center our discussion around four main questions. In section 2, we present an experiment by Abeler et al. (2010) that analyzes the relative importance of two conicting fairness principleswage equality and horizontal equity. In particular, Abeler et al. study whether equal wages are considered fair and look at potentially detrimental consequences of equal wages on performance. In section 3, we turn to a second question that becomes important when principals interact with more than one agent, namely, whether the principal can observe 1 We deliberately restrict our attention to a relatively narrow set of studies based on our own work to be able to provide an in-depth perspective on how economic experiments can be used to study the questions of interest. For recent comprehensive reviews on laboratory and eld experiments in labor economics, see Charness/Kuhn 2011 and List/Rasul 2011. agents' individual performance or only the outcomes of the group of agents as a whole. We present a recent study by Kleine and Kube (2010) that addresses the question whether reporting (subjective) performance measures can enhance the eciency of interaction in work groups. Next, we discuss a study by Schneider and Kube (2006) that analyzes how dierences in social proximity aect gift exchange in multi-worker rms. In particular, the experiment discussed in section 4 studies whether principals tend to (unfairly) favor agents with whom they have closer social ties and discusses potential implications for wage transparency within rms. Wage discrimination again plays a role in section 5 where we address the question how workers' fairness perceptions and propensity to exert work eort interact with rms' production technology. In multi-worker rms, workers' individual productivities can be intertwined for technological reasons.
In particular, situations exist where it can be optimal from an economic perspective to pay dierential rewards for equal performance of workers. We present a recent paper by Goerg et al. (2010) In particular, the experimenter exactly knows the information structure, production functions, and compensation schemes, and he obtains precise measures of variables that are inherently dicult to observe in eld setups (e.g., workers' ability and eort levels). Second, the variables of interest can be exogenously varied in dierent treatment conditions of an experiment. This enables the researcher to identify clear causal eects of variations in, e.g., incentive schemes, production technology, or information conditions. All this allows for rigorous testing of theoretical models on labor market gift exchange. By contrast, this is hardly possible with non-experimental data on workplace behavior. For example, observed variations in wages might be driven by rm size, self-selection of workers, or simply productivity dierences. Observed variations in work output might thus not only be caused by workers' eort but by dierences in ability or production technology. Studying the fundamentals of gift-exchange relations with observational data is thus quite hardeven if a positive association between wages and eort is observed, this could reect, e.g., strategic considerations based on reputation and repeated interactions. In the laboratory, these factors can be varied in a controlled fashion (Falk/Heckman 2009 
The Importance of Wage Discretion
The potential of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device is likely to depend on the institutions that shape the employment relation, above all the mode of payment. A key question in this context is how to treat agents relative to each other as this aects the perceived fairness of a pay scheme. Abeler et al. (2010) study this question by analyzing two important fairness principles: horizontal equality and equity.
The specic wage institution they consider is wage equality. Paying equal wages to workers on the same level of a hierarchy is common practice in many rms (e.g., Medo/Abraham 1980; Baker et al. 1988) . Several reasons for equal wages have been brought forward, amongst them increased peer monitoring (Knez/Simester 2001) and lower transaction costs since contracts do not have to be negotiated with every worker individually (see also Prendergast 1999) . Most importantly, a concern for fairness has been a main argument invoked to justify equal wages. It has been argued that dierential pay of co-workers is considered unfair by workers, causes resentment and envy within the workforce, and ultimately lower performance (Pfeer/Langton 1993; Bewley 1999) . Equality is also often referred to in employer-union bargaining as being a cornerstone of a fair wage scheme.
However, it could be that wage equality hampers the eectiveness of gift exchange. This is likely to be the case if agents do not primarily consider wage equality as fair, but rather care about horizontal equity (Adams 1963) . In a work environment, the equity principle demands that a person who exerts higher eort should receive a higher wage compared to his co-worker.
4 Only when performance of co-workers is the same, do equity and equality coincide. However, in real-life work relations this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule.
Whenever workers dier in their performance, horizontal wage equality violates the equity principle since a higher eort is not rewarded with a higher wage. In other words, if equity is important, the often-heard slogan`equal pay for equal work' also implies`unequal pay for unequal work'.
Design
Abeler et al. study the relative importance of these fairness principles by analyzing their implications for work performance and eciency. They do so in a laboratory experiment in which one principal interacts with two agents. The game played is similar to the gift-exchange game described in the introduction with a reversed move order. In a rst stage, each agent chooses the level of costly eort to exert (between 1 and 10). Eort costs are increasing in eort and convex. After observing the agents' eort choices, the principal pays a wage to each agent (between 0 and 100). In the main treatment the principal can choose the level of the wage but she is obliged to pay the same wage to both agents (equal wage treatment or EWT). In the control treatment, she can wage 4 The idea of proportionality in inputs and outcomes dates at least back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. discriminate between the two agents (individual wage treatment or IWT). In both treatments, neither eorts nor wages are contractible, i.e., eort provision and wage payments are voluntary and can not be explicitly enforced. The stage game is repeated twelve times, with principals and agents being randomly rematched in dierent periods of the game (`stranger design'). The payo of agents increases in their wage and decreases in their eort level. The principal's payo increases in the sum of provided eorts and decreases in the wages paid.
As in the bilateral gift-exchange game described in section 1, if all players are rational and selsh the principal will not pay anything to the agents since wage payments only reduce her monetary payo. Anticipating this, both agents will provide the minimal eort (i.e., an eort of 1). Neither the reversed move order nor the presence of additional agents changes this standard prediction. In the presence of social preferences, these predictions change. If agents care foremost about wage equality, there should be no treatment dierence: principals in the individual wage treatment might anticipate a preference for equal treatment and simply pay the same wage to both agents. However, if equity considerations are more important, one should observe that the EWT elicits lower eort levels than the IWT.
Results
Abeler et al. nd that, in both treatments, the agent's individual eort and his own wage are positively correlated which in bilateral gift-exchange experiments was sucient to establish successful relationships. The monetary incentives, i.e., the average level of wages paid for a given eort level, are also similar in both treatments. Nevertheless, agents' behavior diers substantially between treatments. Agents who are paid equal wages exert signicantly lower eorts than agents who are paid individually. Eort levels are nearly twice as high under individual wages, and eorts decline over time when equal wages are paid (see gure 1 ). Especially the performance of agents under individual wages shows how powerful gift exchange can be in eliciting work eort: although explicit contract enforcement is not feasible, 80% of the possible eciency gains are realized.
The strong dierences in eorts suggest that the relative treatment of agents indeed plays an important role in the multi-agent environment. More precisely,
Abeler et al. demonstrate that equal wages are apparently not reconcilable with agents' horizontal fairness considerations. As the authors show, the frequent violations of the equity principle in the equal wage treatment are able to explain the eort dierences between the treatments. In both treatments, agents who exert a higher eort and earn a lower payo than their co-worker strongly decrease their eort in the subsequent period. However, the norm of equity is violated much more frequently under equal wages (whenever agents' eort levels and thus their eort costs dier). Principals in the individual wage treatment seem to understand the mechanisms of equity quite well. When eorts dier, they do pay dierent wages, rewarding the harder-working agent with a higher payo ual wages most principals adhere to the equity principle, and good performance spreads. These results suggest that choosing a wage scheme also inuences the social dynamics between the agents. In the experiment, individual wages lead to positive dynamics since agents orientate themselves by the most hard-working agents. In contrast, the equal wage scheme focuses agents' attention on the least motivated agents.
In summary, the results Abeler et al. suggest a psychological rationale for using individual wages. Subjects perceive equal wages for unequal performance as unfair and reduce their eort subsequently. The traditional economic literature on incentive provision in groups comes to a similar conclusion though for a dierent reason. It is usually argued that the ineciency of equal wages stems from the fact that marginal products and wages are not aligned. This can lead to free-riding among selsh agents (e.g., Holmström 1982; Erev/Bornstein/Galili 1993). Abeler et al. (2010) enlarge the scope of this critical view on wage equality: interestingly, in their setup it is precisely the presence of fair-minded agents and not their absence that calls for the use of individual rewards.
Regarding compensation practice in rms, their ndings highlight the importance of taking the concerns for co-workers' wages into account. However, doing so by paying equal wages to a group of agents may actually do more harm than good. As soon as agents dier in their performance, equal wages which seem to be a fair institution at rst sight might be considered very unfair. While the discouraging eect of equal wages on hard-working agents has long been informally discussed (e.g., Milgrom/Roberts 1992, 418f.), Abeler et al. (2010) provide controlled evidence in favor of this intuition. On the other hand, their study shows that adherence to the equity principle can lead to highly ecient workplace relations, even in the presence of contractual incompleteness.
The Role of Communication
In the study discussed in the previous section, the principal could not stipulate explicit pay-for-performance contracts for the workers. However, he could observe agents' individual performance levels and (voluntarily) pay them individual rewards in the IWT. It turned out that paying such individual-specic rewards in line with the equity principle was crucial for motivating agents to work hard.
However, in many work environments, principals are not able to observe their subordinates' individual work eort and performance. Rather, they receive only aggregate information on the performance of the group of agents as a whole.
This lack of information raises two central questions. First, does the absence of individual-specic information inhibit successful gift exchange between the principal and the agents, e.g., because it aects the principal's power to treat agents equitably? Second, are there means to circumvent such problems, i.e., is there a way for principals to become better informed on agents' individual contributions?
These are exactly the questions studied in a recent paper by Kleine and Kube (2010) . As a natural candidate for how the principal could gather additional information on agents' individual eort levels, Kleine and Kube consider reporting systems in which agents communicate their own performance to the principal. Naturally, agents themselves know their own eort and they can infer the performance of their co-worker when they additionally know the group performance. The crucial question is whether by asking agents about their individual performance, principals can obtain at least partially valuable information on agents' actual individual performance. Intuitively, agents' reports are`cheap talk' and principals cannot verify whether a given agent has reported own and others' performance truthfully. If agents anticipate that the principal rewards them according to the equity principle, they have immediate pecuniary incentives to overstate their own performance and to underreport the co-worker's performance.
There are two main motives that might prevent agents from deceiving and lead them to report individual performances truthfully. First, strategic considerations might generate long-run interests that work against the short-term incentive to deceive. Such strategic incentives can emerge through repeated interaction with the principal and co-worker, since agents fear that principals or co-workers might punish deception by withholding eorts or paying lower Agents are not informed about the reports made by their co-worker.
Results
Kleine and Kube nd that gift exchange can be established in repeated interactions between principals and agents. This basic result holds true for both treatments: despite the fact that principals are not able to observe agents' individual eorts, the implicit incentives in repeated interactions are strong enough to maintain ecient gift exchange. However, Kleine and Kube nd remarkable dierences between treatments in terms of overall eciency. Figure 3 This is interesting because frequent equity-norm violations are a driving force behind agents' behavior in EWT, and these violations might occur in NoCom as well. In fact, it is observed that i) rms in NoCom regularly choose to pay equal wages which would violate the equity principle whenever agents dier in their eort levels and ii) agents' reactions to equity norm violations are very similar in EWT and NoCom. However, while actual violations are very frequent in EWT (90% of the time), they only occur in 65% of all cases in NoCom.
In the other instances, principal and agents manage to adhere to an equity norm. Many agents in NoCom thus seem to realize that norm violations can only be avoided if they choose identical eorts. The partner matching additionally enables them to coordinate on equal (and high) eort levels, which in turn explains the relatively high degree of eciency in NoCom. Yet it should be noted that, although the repeated interaction facilitates the use of gift-exchange for overcoming the problems of contractual incompleteness, it does not seem to be central. For example, rms in IWT do much better than in NoCom even though reputational concerns cannot play a role there due to the stranger matching procedure. This further underlines the importance of rms being able to discriminate wages between workers in a sensible way.
But why does communication lead to lower eciency in Com compared to
NoCom? Principals could systematically use agents' reports as an additional source of information for the wage setting decision. This might positively aect agents' eort if it helps to reduce equity norm violations. These positive consequences are in fact observed in Com. Principals take the reports into account and equity norm violations are reduced by about 29%. However, the reporting possibilities also lead to negative eects, which oset and even exceed the positive aspects. These negative eects are caused by (the anticipation of ) agents misreporting their eort choice. In 56% of all cases, at least one agent overstates his or her eort choice; and principals observe it because in that case the sum of reported eorts does not match the sum of actual eorts. As a consequence, reporting spreads additional distrust in the principal-team setting, in the vertical principal-agent relationship as well as in the horizontal relationship within the team. On the one hand, this is reected in the observation that principals significantly reduce their wage payments after they receive a misreport. On the other hand, negative eort reactions after equity norm violations are more pronounced in Com than in NoComwhich might be due to the relatively unkind behavior of the principals after a misreport, but most likely also due to agents' mutual concerns that the co-worker might lie at their cost. Reporting thus comes at the cost of distrust and frustration among the team members.
The results in Kleine and Kube (2010) clearly demonstrate that certain communication structures might be counterproductive. If principals in organizations ask workers about their individual contributions to team performance and want to adapt their wages or bonuses accordingly, the reported evidence suggests that the reporting mechanism should be chosen carefully. Unfavorable communication structures may reduce the power of gift exchange and reduce the agents' motivation to exert high eort in the team. It might be better to refrain from reports on individual performance, as long as the accompanied communication structures cannot eectively prevent the development of distrust among the concerned parties.
(No) Impact of Personal Relations
The previous studies highlight that it is possible to successfully establish ecient gift-exchange relationships in multi-worker rms. A necessary condition seems to be that the wage payments are perceived as fair by the workers, which in the context of multi-worker rms includes that wages must be compatible with a norm of equity. In the preceding studies, this meant that hard-working agents should earn more than lazy agents. This interpretation is straightforward if all players are anonymous strangers, as is the case in most lab experiments in economics.
Yet, actual employment relationships are characterized by a rich set of personal relationships between members of the rm. Social ties are frequently observed between direct co-workers but also across layers of a rm's hierarchy, i.e., between principals and agents. Particularly the latter relationships might aect the eective use of gift exchange to mitigate moral hazard under incomplete contracts. First, it might happen that those workers who maintain a close relationship to the principal work harder, simply because they have sentiments for that person. To explore these eects, Schneider and Kube (2006) conduct a laboratory experiment in which, as in the studies described in the previous sections, one principal interacts with two agents. The crucial feature of their experiment is that one of the agents is a real-life friend of the principal, whereas the other agent is an anonymous stranger. This novel feature, combined with a treatment variation on transparency versus secrecy of co-workers' wages, allows them to study under controlled laboratory conditions how personal relationships aect gift exchange.
Design
Except for some parameter values, the game studied by Schneider and Kube is similar to the individual wage treatment in Abeler et al. (2010) . Each rm consists of one principal and two agents who play a reversed gift-exchange game.
On a rst stage, agents simultaneously decide how much costly eort e i to exert (with e i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9}). On a second stage, the principal observes agents' eort choices and can pay an individual wage w i to each agent. Finally, payos are realized: agents earn their individual wage minus their eort costs, and the principal earns what is produced by the agents' eort minus the wage payments.
In each rm, the principal and one agent are real-life friends while the second agent is a stranger who is matched anonymously in each rm.
6 Each group interacts repeatedly for 12 rounds in a partner design, i.e., the groups of three stay the same throughout the experiment. A repeated game is necessary to analyze the inuence of friendship on participants' fairness perceptions and behavior.
Friends, of course, need to remain paired in the same group. Moreover, the repeated partner design allows for a more direct response of an agent to his or her wage payment.
5 In a sense, this is basically part of the original idea of Akerlof on gift-exchange, namely that it is natural that persons have utility for making gifts to institutions for which they have sentiment (1982, 550).
6 In the following, the anonymous agent will be referred to as`stranger' and the acquainted agent as`friend'.
Schneider and Kube study two treatment variations that dier in the degree of wage secrecy between the agents. In the rst treatment, wages are fully transparent, i.e., both agents can observe the wage of their co-worker in every period. In the second treatment, agents only observe each others' eort but not their wage or payo. In both treatments, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under the assumption of rational and selsh individuals is again to pay minimal wages and to exert minimal eorts. As before it would be socially ecient to exert maximal eorts given the cost and production functions.
Results
In line with the results reported in section 2 and section 3, Schneider and Kube observe strong indications of reciprocal behavior. Higher eort on average leads to a higher wage and to a higher payo. As can be seen in gure 4, the positive correlation between eort and wages is equally strong for friends and strangers.
The overall correlation between eort and wages under public wages is ρ = .76 for the friend and ρ = .71 for the stranger. It is slightly less pronounced under wage secrecy with ρ = .62 for the friend and ρ = .41 for the stranger. The eort levels are remarkably high in both treatments. Friends (strangers) provide on average an eort of 7.4 (7.3) under public wages and 8.1 (8.2) in the case of wage secrecy.
There are no signicant dierences in eorts, neither between treatments, nor between friend and stranger. Overall, 85% of the possible eciency gains are realizedalthough explicit contract enforcement is not feasible. Interestingly, also no signicant dierences in wages or in payos can be found.
The average wage paid to a friend (stranger) is 48 (44) under public wages and 51 (53) when wages are private information. Thus even under a wagesecrecy regime, only weak signs of nepotism are observed by Schneider and Kube. 7 The principal treats his acquaintance almost in the same way as he 7 There are only 16 instances in which agents choose equal eort levels but the friend is paid a higher wage. In these cases, the wage payment is on average 14% higher than the stranger's wage. It should be noted, however, that side-payments between the principal and his friend cannot be precluded after subjects have left the laboratory. treats the stranger. This is also underlined by data from a questionnaire that was administered to the subjects after the experiment. Principals uniformly and strongly agree to the statement`I treated the agents equally', and agents strongly disagree to the statement`The other agent was treated better'. The ndings thus suggest that a norm of equity is highly valued by both, the principal and the agents. In fact, violations of the equity norm happen only very rarely. If they occur, they have considerable eects on agents' behavior because violations immediately lead to lower levels of eort in the following round. Principals seem to recognize or even anticipate this (an observation which is shared by the previously reported studies). They abstain from favoring their friends, in particular when other agents could observe it. As a consequence, gift exchange again successfully mitigates the problems of implicit contracts. This suggests that potential problems arising from the presence of personal relationships across the rm's hierarchical layers can be overcome. Moreover, the tentative evidence reported by Schneider and Kube indicates that the use of implicit contracts in combination with wage transparency can pose a limit on nepotism.
Social Preferences in the Presence of Explicit Incentives
The study presented in the previous section looked at heterogeneity among agents with respect to personal relationships. From an purely economic perspective, such a form of heterogeneity should not give rise to wage discrimination in multi-worker rms. By contrast, if agents dier in terms of ability and performance, incentive schemes in organizations should try to account for this, e.g., by Such an incentive scheme might seem inappropriate at rst sight. However, a recent theoretical model developed by Winter (2004) shows thatdepending on the form of the production functionsituations might exist where this is part of the optimal incentive mechanism. This surprising theoretical result, derived under the standard assumptions of fully rational, self-centered and moneymaximizing behavior, seems to stand in sharp contrast to the implications from research on fairness and equity preferences, whose bottom line is that even a small intrinsic concern for justice, [. . . ] for early evidence on overcondence about contribution to a joint project).
wage structure (Konow 2000 (Konow , 1089 ; see also Bolton/Ockenfels 2000; Fehr/ Schmidt 1999; Mowday 1991; Young 1994 or Selten 1978 . Goerg et al. (2010) test within the framework of Winter's model whether the psychological cost of the inequality induced by wage discrimination decreases the eciency of the theoretically optimal mechanism.
Winter's Model
The general model analyzed by Winter (2004) features n agents who work on a joint project. The agents decide simultaneously and independently whether they work and provide positive eort or whether they shirk and provide zero eort.
Exerting eort is costly for the agents, with costs being equal across all agents.
Individual eort is assumed to be non-observable and non-contractible. Instead, the increase in the project success probability is highest for the rst agent who provides eort, and the incremental increase in the success probability gets lower for every additional unit of eort.
A reward mechanism, dening the rewards for each worker, is said to be strongly incentive-inducing if it induces all agents to exert eort as a unique Nash equilibrium, and it is optimal if it does so at minimal cost from a principal's perspective. The mechanism is symmetric if rewards are constant across all agents and it is discriminating if rewards dier across agents. It can be shown that a symmetric, optimal, strongly incentive-inducing mechanism exists if and only if the production function is one of substitutability. In contrast, a production function of complementarity implies that the optimal, strongly incentiveinducing mechanism is fully discriminating; that is, agents should optimally be paid dierent rewards even if they are perfectly symmetric.
A technology of increasing returns to scale is a sucient, but not a necessary, condition for full discrimination. In fact, it is only necessary that an agent's incentive to exert eort increases with the number of other agents who do so, which for example might also be caused by psychological eects like peer pressure (see Kandel/Lazear 1992; Barron/Gjerde 1997; Falk/Ichino 2006 the interaction between production function, equity considerations, and reward schemes, while at the same time ensuring that agents are perfectly identical. In the experiment, three players work on a joint project and exert costly eorts.
Their total sum of eort determines the number of units of a good produced by the joint project for a given production function. The payo of a player is given by the productivity (i.e., the number of units produced by the group) multiplied by an individual reward, minus the cost of eort. Goerg et al. create four dierent treatments by manipulating the characteristics of the production function (either a function of complementarity or of substitutability) as well as of the reward scheme (either a symmetric or a discriminating mechanism), while at the same time keeping the sum of rewards per produced unit constant.
Results
As predicted by Winter's model, the subjects in the experiment of Goerg et al. respond to the shape of the production function. Under a production function of complementarity, the use of a symmetric reward scheme elicits signicantly lower eorts and eciency than the use of a cost-equivalent discriminating reward scheme. The same discriminating reward scheme yields lower eorts when it is used under a production function of substitutability.
Figure 5 reveals that in the case of a discriminating reward scheme and a production function of complementarity even the worker with the lowest reward exerts high amounts of eort. The main reason for this is that asymmetric rewards facilitate coordination because workers can anticipate that those who have high stakes at hand will certainly exert eort, which in turn incentivizes the other worker to exert eort as well.
In real-life organizations, this discrimination is often implemented through non-monetary rewards, e.g., prestige, or by using articial classications or (job) titles for seemingly similar tasks, e.g.,`Project Head' or`Team Captain'. Complementarity; Sub: Substitutability) (Goerg et al. 2010 ).
example, lawyers, consultants and accountants are paid according to seniority.
This special form of discrimination creates common knowledge about the stakes that everyone has in the project's success, and thus fosters cooperation and coordination; at the same time it does not invoke equity concerns because everyone knows that his turn will come to be senior partner. The experimental results
show that under a production function of complementarity even transparent discrimination contributes to eciency. tasks in a way that makes workers' eort complements rather than substitutes may lead to major eciency gains. Insofar as peer pressure constitutes a complementarity in eort exertion, the strengthening of social ties among the workforce alone might have a strong impact on productivity.
Concluding Remarks
Our purpose in this article was to illustrate how research in experimental economics can contribute to a better understanding of the interdependencies between equity and eciency in employment relations that are characterized by contractual incompleteness. We have focused on a selection of papers that study situations in which one principal interacts with several agents. These are particularly interesting not only because of their higher degree of realism compared to bilateral gift-exchange relations, but also because equity concerns become more complex and more interesting when there is both a vertical and a horizontal dimension of fairness. Overall, the ndings discussed in this article suggest that eciency-enhancing gift exchange can work well in multi-agent rms when basic equity considerations are taken into account.
In this article, we could only discuss a small selection of studies that does The studies discussed in the previous sections show that social comparisons, fairness perceptions and subsequent behavioral reactions determine the success of gift-exchange relationships. This has also been illustrated in work environments outside the laboratory Cohn et al. 2011 ; but see also Gneezy/List 2006) . The general importance of social comparison and equity-norm violations is also underlined by recent neurophysiological evidence (Flieÿbach et al. 2007; Dohmen et al. 2011) .
A second important message from the evidence presented in this article is that wage dierentiation per se does not imply that workers feel treated unfairly as shown in sections 2 and 5. A much more nuanced picture that goes beyond the notion of simple one-dimensional wage comparison eects has emerged from recent research. The perception of a given wage crucially depends on the information workers have, e.g., on the production technology or their co-workers' eort and productivity. A distinctive advantage of an experimental approach is that information conditions and other important factors of the production process can be varied exogenously, which in turn allows identifying causal inuences of individual factors as well as potential interdependencies between them. For instance, Charness and Kuhn (2007) study the impact of co-worker comparison and wage secrecy in a situation where co-workers dier in their inherent productivity rather than their actual performance. They nd that wage discrimination is not generally considered unfair by agents. Rather, agents tend to accept pay dierences if these are rationalized by dierences in ability. In a setup similar to the one considered in section 4, Brandts and Solà (2010) study how personal relations between a principal and one agent aect workplace performance. They show that principals tend to favor the agents to whom they have closer social ties, but that such dierential treatment is also justied since the agent with closer personal relations reciprocates more strongly. Consequently, favoring of friends does not aect the performance of agents with weaker social ties in the experiment of Brandts and Solà (2010) . In a similar vein, Gächter and Thöni (2010) show that reactions to wage discrimination depend on the underlying reasons for pay discrimination rather than to the resulting payo dierences per se. Gächter et al. (2011) also underline the notion that wage comparison alone does not aect gift-exchange relationships. Rather, social comparisons between co-workers seem to be multi-dimensional, taking into account information on others' performance as well as their wage level. An important implication of these results as well as those in section 3 is that the success of gift-exchange relations can under certain circumstances be inuenced by manipulating the ow of information.
Inspired by empirical ndings, a growing number of theoretical models analyzes economic incentives in the workplace, taking social preferences and social comparison processes into account. For instance, Kölle et al. (2011) analyze the consequences of inequality in ex-ante and ex-post payments and the resulting incentives for inequity-averse agents to engage in a team production task. Dur and Sol (2010) discuss the inuence of nancial incentives on the work climate when agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also build up altruistic sentiments for their co-workers via social interaction in the workplace.
Related to the topics discussed in section 3 and section 4, Sol (2010) has recently developed a theoretical model in which agents have superior information on the performance of co-workers. He analyzes how agents' preferences for truth-telling, their interpersonal relations to co-workers, and nancial incentives inuence the value of cheap-talk reporting systems for the principal.
Recent theoretical and empirical research has contributed a lot to our understanding of gift exchange and the relation between equity and eciency when contracts are incomplete. The small selection of this work presented here already highlights the importance of looking at multi-rather than single-worker rms and models. Understanding what is perceived as fair becomes much more complicated when more than one worker is involved. The examples discussed above illustrate some potential caveats to be kept in mind when designing incentive schemes for more than one worker. More research is called for, e.g., regarding environments where reciprocity must not necessarily manifest itself in the form of higher eort levels but rather in lower absenteeism, higher loyalty, or lower turn-over.
